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ABSTRACT
Japan has experienced turbulent behavior of land prices after World War II, especially after 1985.
This paper first examines the explanatory power of a simple present-value model and shows its limitation.
We then investigate two additional (not mutually exclusive) factors affecting the Japanese land price
behavior: distortionary inheritance and capital-gains taxation, and excessive price sensitivity due to the non-
Walrasian structure of the land market.  Empirical results show that distortionary taxation is a major culprit
of high residential land price, and that the non-Walrasian price behavior magnifies the effect of underlying
change in the market fundamentals.
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Japan has experienced turbulent behavior in land prices after theWorld War II as is depicted in Figures
1 (level) and 2 (rate of change) 1• Between 1955 and 1990, the residential land price inthe metropolitan
area (six largest cities) soared by more than two hundred times,whereas the stock price rose by ninety
times. Since the consumer price index was increased by eight times during the same period,the real
value of land increased tremendously. This spectacular increase in the land priceuntil 1990 was behind
the so-called Tochi Shinwa (the Myth of Land) that land was an ultimate safeharbor always beating
any other assets with ever-increasing prices. The myth wasfirmly entrenched in the post-war Japanese
economic history.
There were three distinctive episodes for this phenomenon. The first one wasfrom the end of the
1950s to the middle of the 1960s when Japan enjoyed high economic growth. Thesecond was just before
the first oil crisis in 1974, which was triggered by the national development planning proposedby the
central government to alleviate the income differences between urban and non-urban areas.The third
one was in the late 1980s, which was often attributed to theincreased demand for office space in Tokyo
under the expectation that Tokyo would become the center for international financialtransactions. It is
remarkable to note that except for one year (1975) the land price did not fall between1955 and 1990.
In light of the tremendous increase in land prices until 1990, the magnitude andthe duration of their
downfall in the 1990s are also astonishing. The price was halved in five years fromthe peak of 1990,
and it is still declining as of the end of 1997. It is now well-known that bad loan problems plaguedin
the Japanese banking system in this period stemmed from these "ever-declining"land prices. The sweet
"Myth of Land" went sour: it turned into a "Nightmare of Land".
This turbulent behavior of land prices just described needs explanation, and the resultingturmoil in
the Japanese economy needs prescription. Thus, land price behavior has been attractingmuch attention
of economists as well as policy makers. In analyzing the land price behavior, mosteconomists and policy
makers have been using the present value (PV) model as a starting point. However,the PV model is
based on the assumption of a well-organized asset market with no transaction cost.The Japanese land
1The land price is the Residential Land Price Index of Six Largest Cities, poblislted by the Japan Real EstateInstitote.
(Japan Real Estate Institute, Shigaichi Kakaku Shisnu [Urban Land Pt-ice mdcxl,varioos issoes). This price index is based
on the assessment of licensed real estate appraisers. Since their standardizedassessment procedore is based on actual
transaction prices, the index reflects the movement of market prices. The stock price is the TOPIXof the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, and the consomer price index is that of Tokyo's Twenty-Three Wards, bothtaken 1ron the Nikkei Data Base.
1market is full of various distortions and high transaction costs, so the PV model may not be valid in this
market.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the applicability of the PV model and to show its limitation
as a theory for the Japanese land market. We then investigate two additional (not mutually exclusive)
factors affecting the Japanese land price behavior: the effect of distortion in the inheritance and capital
gains tax systems, and excessive price sensitivity due to the non4Valrasian market structure of the
Japanese land market.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we examine the PV model as a theory
for the Japanese land market. We extend the PV framework to incorporate quasi-rent in the form of
tax saving, stemming from distortionary inheritance and capital-gains taxation in which land is treated
differently from financial assets with respect to the tax rate and the tax base. \Ve test the validity of
this augmented PV model as a long-run theory for Japanese land price behavior. We then turn to
short run price behavior in Section 3. We develop a short-run model of land price behavior based on
the non-Walrasian nature of the land market, and test its validity in both in commercial and residential
properties. Section 4 concludes the paper with remarks of the limitations and possible extensions of this
research.
2 Distortionary Taxation and Long-Run Land Price Behavior
2.1 Simple and Augmented Present Value Models
2.1.1 Frictionless Asset Market and a Simple PV Model
The present value (PV) model in its simplest form assumes that the land market can be approximated
as a frictionless asset market with no distortionary taxation. Then, further assuming the risk neutrality
of investors, we have the familiar no-arbitrage condition:
—
whereP and R respectively denote the current (real) price of land and its (real) rent, 11Z-i the expected
land price, i, the nominal rate of interest, and lr the expected rate of inflation. Rearranging terms in
the no-arbitrage condition, we have a current land price that is equal to the "fundamentals" that are the
present value of current rent plus the expected future price as follows:
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2.1.2Special Treatment of Land in the Tax System and an Augmented PV Model
There are, however, two factors that make the Japanese land market deviate from the perfect asset market
of the simple PV model. First, the land market is characterized by high transaction costs (e.g.,high
brokerage fees, and high registration and acquisition taxes). It is not centralized and the buyer and the
seller search out their counterparts. The land price is usually determined in the negotiation between the
seller and the buyer who happeu to meet. The seller has his reservation price: the minimum selling price
under which the seller does not want to sell. Similarly, the buyer has his reservation price: the maximum
purchasing price over which the buyer does not want to buy. If the buyer's maximum purchasing price is
no less than the seller's minimum selling price, the trade takes place. The transaction price lies between
the seller's minimum selling price and the buyer's maximum purchasing price. The determination of the
actual transaction price depends on the structure of bargaining and the bargaining skills of the seller and
the buyer. This market structure implies that the no-arbitrage relationship of the PV model may not
hold in the short run, although it eventually prevails iu the long run.
Secondly, there may be additional benefits other than land rent for investors to hold land in their
portfolio. For individuals (especially farmers), it is widely pointed out that land has been a very good
tax shelter (Ito 1994, ICanemoto 1997). This means the rent in (2.1) should include not only the land rent
but the quasi-rent for tax saving purposes. Distortion in the inheritance and capital gains tax systems
in Japan has often been suggested as a most probable culprit that makes the land price deviate from
the simple PV model (Nishimura 1995). Land is undervalued in the inheritance tax base, and thus
individuals can lessen their tax burden by holding their assets in the form of land.
The "tax-shelter service" of land is found only for individuals, not for corporations since there is no
inheritance tax for the latter. However, Japanese corporations had in the past their own incentive to
hold land in addition to earning the land rent. Land was considered as the most desirable collateral by
banks. Thus, to own land made borrowing easy even in difficult periods for corporations (Nishimura
1996: p.154). This "collateral service" should also be included in the quasi-rent.
Therefore, in order to examine the PV model in the Japanese land market, we should consider an
3augmented PV model incorporating these quasi-rents, insteadof the simple PV model (2.1), such that
= +[PVQRh,
where [PVQRI denotes the present value of future quasi-rents. Moreover, weshould take the augmented
PV model as a long-run relationship rather than a short-run relationship.
In this section, we calculate the present value of quasi-rent, and assessthe explanatory power of the
augmented PV model. As for individuals, we calculate the taxshelter value of land for individuals in
Section 2.2, which is the discounted present value of tax saving from holdingthe land. We consider the
tax shelter value both for farmers and non-farmers. Unfortunately however,it is difficult to calculate
the present value of the collateral service of land for corporations, so we are obligedto omit it in the




It is worthwhile to show the practical importance of the tax shelter valueof land for individuals in
explaining land prices. If marginal sellers of land are corporations,then the tax shelter value of land for
individuals does not have practical importance. However, Table 1 shows that most marginalland sellers
have been individuals both nationwide and at the center of Tokyo. The corporatesector has been the
net buyer except for 1978 and 1993-96 at the national level, and exceptfor 1982 at the center of Tokyo.
Thus, factors affecting individuals' decision to sell land, of whichthe tax shelter value is most important,
are likely to influence land price behavior.
This is especially the case in farmland conversion to residential land.Farmland conversion has
been a major supply source of residential land in the post-World War IIurbanization. Under Japanese
agricultural laws, no commercial corporation has been allowed to ownfarmland. Thus, the tax shelter
value of land for farmers as individuals, is likely to influence residential land price.We will see its
influence in the following two sections.
2.2 Calculation of the TaxShelterValue of Land
In this section, we briefly summarize the characteristics of distortion inthe Japanese tax system with
respect to land, and then calculate the tax shelter valueof the land due to this distortion, which will be
4used later in the empiricnl analysis.2 A more detailed discussion can be found in Appendix A.
2.2.1 Distortion in the Japanese Tax System
Inheritance Tax Three distinctive characteristics should be pointed out concerning the Japanese in-
heritance tax system. First, there is a substantially favorable treatment for land in the inheritance tax
base. Although all bequeathed assets, securities, and real estate are valued at their fair market value
in principle, land is assessed, in practice, substantially lower than their market value (Barthold and Ito
1992, pp. 250-251). Since the assessment is not open to the public and sometimes vary among locals,
it is hard to obtain information about the magnitude of under-assessment. However, experts say it was
around 60% of the market value before the 1990s.3 There is no such special treatment for financial
assets. Their value is assessed at the market value.
Secondly, there is an even more favorable treatment for farm property. After 1975, the value of
farmland in the Tokyo metropolitan area has been, in fact, assessed based on agricultural income from
the land if the farmer's heir pledges to continue farming,4 even though his farmland is traded as residential
land in the market place. For example, in 1995, the average agricultural income per square meter was
about 173 yen,5 and its capitalization value was 3,460 yen if we use a 5% interest rate. In contrast, the
corresponding average land price was about 500,000 yen, implying that the assessed value of the farmland
was 0.7% of the market value. Thus, by pledging to continue farming, the farmer's heir could virtually
avoid paying the inheritance tax.
Finally, changes in the tax system have been not systematic but haphazard (see Table A. 1 in Ap-
pendix A). There was some inflationary adjustment in basic exemption between 1958 and 1974, but this
was not adequate in light of the considerable land price inflation depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Then, a
sharp rise in land prices in 1973 brought an even heavier tax burden, triggering political pressure on the
government to ease the burden. The government increased basic exemptions by more than three times.
An even more haphazard movement is found in the tax schedule. The schedule was unchanged from 1958
to 1987, which was just incredible in a period of skyrocketing land price inflation. As political pressure
mounted to change the schedule in the last half of the 1980s, the government finally changed the schedule
2Here we follow the lead of Kanemoto (1094). There are several differe,ices between our approach arid Kaue,notu's. In
particular, Kanemoto considers the tax distortion in only uric point in tirue, while we consider the dynaniic behavior of the
tax distortion.
3See Hayashi et al (1090). Land is assessed at Roscn-Ka said to be aroond 70% of Koji-Chika, wluch in torn was aroorid
80 % of the market price before tIne 1990s. Connbiidng these hlgores, the assessment was aroond 60% of the market valoe.
4Formnally, tIme difference between the nmarket value of time land and its farming valae based on its agricoltoral proceeds
is exempt from the value of land, which inmplies tIme land is assessed at its farming value.
5See Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry arid Fisheries, Statistics for Agricaltzmral .frmcome 1995.
5in 1988. Since then, the schedule has changed twice in seven years (see Table A.1 in Appendix A for
details).
Capital Gains Tax The capital gains tax is far more complicated and its changes have been even more
haphazard than the inheritance tax changes6 (see Table A.2 in Appendix A). We identify four distinctive
features.
First, the capital gains tax on land holding is substantial. This is in sharp contrast with the financial
assets, since there is virtually no capital gains tax on them. Moreover, long-term landholdings and
short-run ones are taxed differently.In general, short-run landholdings are more heavily taxed than
long-run holdings. Overall capital gains tax on short-term holding is in general almost twice as much as
those on long term holdings.
Secondly, the capital gains tax system has been pendulatiag between progressive taxation and a flat
rate. Before 1968, the capital gains tax was progressive. Between 1969 and 1975, it was a flat rate
taxation. Between 1976 and 1988, it was a two-part taxation, in which a flat rate was applied to a
certain amount and progressive taxation followed beyond that amount. Between 1988 and 1991, it was
still a progressive system, but it had only two rates in which the degree of progressiveness was greatly
reduced. Between 1992 and 1994, it returned to a flat rate. After 1995, it went back once more to a
progressive system with two or three rates depending on particular years.
Thirdly, the definition of "long-term holding", special exemption, and the tax rates changed quite
frequently. Until recently, the direction of the change was to increase tax burdens on land. For example,
the required length to be eligible for long-term holdings increased from three years (1968) to ten years
(1982). The tax rate was also increased from fourteen percent (1969) to thirty nine perceat(1992). There
was no economic rationale for this haphazard change.
Lastly, between 1973 and 1992 a special provision lowered tax rates on farmland in the Tokyo, Osaka,
and Nagoya metropolitan areas. This provision was a result of heavy lobbying by urban farmers to lessen
their tax burden.
6Ito (1994) provides us with a concise sunirnary of taxes levied on land, including capital gains taxes.
62.2.2 Tax Shelter Values for Farmersand Non-Farmers
Let us now estimate the tax shelter valueof land, due to distortion in the inheritance and capitalgains
tax systems described in the previoussection. The tax savings from landholdingsdiffer considerably
among individuals depending ontheir income, the size and location of their land,and so on. Since we
are concerned with land prices in metropolitanareas, especially the Tokyo area, weconsider a model
family with substantial landholdings inthe Tokyo Metropolitan Area. Its tax sheltervalue will be used
as a proxy of the tax shelter valuein estimating the augmented PV model (2.2).
Since farmers and non-farmers are treateddifferently in the inheritance tax system, weconsider two
types of families: a farm familyand a non-farm family.
(a) A farm family here is in fact atoken farmer. The family's primary income sourceis
outside farming, and it is in the essence a land speculator.To make this clear, we assume
that the family leaves its lot virtually vacant (growingsome token crops of negligible economic
significance).
(b) A non-farm family here has a large premise,and most of its lots are vacant or used as a
garden. Like the farm family, thenon-farm family is also a de facto land speculator.The
family keeps the lots vacant, since if itleases them to someone, it loses many rights onthem
under the current Tenancy Law (Shalcuchi-ShakkaHo).7
The above description of a model familywith large landholdings is somewhat exaggerated,but it
reveals common characteristics of large landholdingsin the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. Regardlessof
agricultural or residential landholdings, they arethe means of intertempOral speculation.
In order to investigate the effect of tax distortion,we have to specify the family structureand its
change in time because the tax exemptiondepends on the number of statutory heirs (seeAppendix A).
We assume that one generation of the familyconsists of the father, the mother, and twochildren (son
and daughter). As to the change in the family structure,we assume the followingscenario:8
(1) The father of each generational familyis deceased twenty-five years after his successionto
his own father, and then the father's assets arebequeathed to his widow and twochildren.9
7Mostof all,the lessor can terminate tbe tenancy wily onder very
restrictive conditions. In practice, it is virtoally
impossible for tbe lessor toterminatetbe tenancy once lie leases Ins land to the lessee.
5We follow Kairemoto (1994) in assoming this scenario.
9Aniong all mothers wbo give birth to the first baby,niotbers at the age 25-29 have occopied the largest sbarefor 50
years, and 48.2% as of year 1990. Ministry
of Health arid Welfare, Vital Statistics of Japan (JinkonDoutai Ghosa), 1998.
7(2) Within one year after her spouse's death, the widow is also deceased, and her assets are
inherited by her two children.
(3) In (1) and (2) above, the daughter gives up her statutory share, and the entire assets of
the father and the mother are actually inherited by the son, who becomes the head of the
next generation.1°
This is one of many possible scenarios, and admittedly a simple one. However, since qualitative results
do not change even if we assume more complex and realistic cases, we use this rather simple one as an
illustrative case.
Let us consider a model family just after the succession from the previous generation to the current
generation. In this period, the family owns Xm2 of vacant land but has no financial assets.The
family considers its asset position fifty years from now, after two generations. The family will convert
all landholdings into financial assets at that time. Taking this condition as given, the family is now
considering whether to sell marginal land (for concreteness we assume that it is loom2) in this period or
not.
We define two portfolios:
No-Sell Portfolio W1: The family does not sell the land in this period. Twenty-five years from
now, succession from this generation to the next one occurs. The next generation finances
the inheritance tax payment by selling land, which is at the same time subject to capital
gains tax.11 Then, another twenty-five years lapses, and another succession occurs. The
new generation liquidates all land holdings, pays the inheritance tax, and holds their assets
in only financial assets. The present value of this portfolio in this period is denoted by W1.
Sell Portfolio W2: In this case, the family sells the marginal land of lOOm2, pays the capital
gains tax, and holds the proceeds in financial assets yielding interests. When the succession
occurs, the next generation first tries to pay the inheritance tax by selling financial assets. If
'°Tlus patrilineal assumption is justified for farm fanulies since the eldest sun of a farmer, who is a successor of the
father's farming, usually inherits most of the family's farmland.This assurnptioir is more proble,natic for non-farm
families. However, it is still tire case the eldest son of a family with substantial land holdings indrerits the principal part of
the holdings. Tl,us, the assumption cant be considered as a first approximation even for non-farm fanulies with large land
holdings.
'11t is possible to save the inheritance tax by borrowing front banks and at tire same time to buy another land, since
the full anrount of loan balances are deducted from the inheritance tax base but that tire assessed value of new land is
substantially lower than tire market value. See Harthruld arid Itu (1992) fur details. However, we ignore tIns possibility in
our calculation.
8they are inadequate, it starts selling land. Otherwise, this portfolio is the same as the No-Sell
Portfolio. The present value of this portfolio in this period is denoted by W2.
In order to calculate W1 and W2, the family must have expectations about current and future land
prices, interest rates, and the tax structure. To highlight the effect of tax distortion as clear as possible
and to make analysis tractable, we make the following expectational assumptions.
(A. 1) The model family assumes the current and future rate of nominal land price inflation
will be constant in the future and equal to the average of the nominal interest rates in the
last three years. That is, the family assumes the expected rate of return on its land (which is
the expected capital gains under the Assumption (a) above) shall be the same as the financial
assets.
(A.2) The model family assumes that the current inheritance and capital gains tax systems will
be perfectly adjusted to land price inflation in the future. Moreover, the current assessment
practice in the inheritance tax will continue in which the value of land is assessed at sixty
percent of the market value, while that of financial assets is assessed at the market value.
The assumption (A.1) seems to be the most conservative assumption with respect to land price
inflation in most of the post-World War II period which we consider, except for the 1990s. Actual land
price inflation is much higher than the nominal interest rate as shown in Figure 2 until 1990. We make
this assumption in order to highlight the magnitude of the tax distortion's effect on land prices. It will
be shown that we end up with a large distortion, even though we make this very conservative assumption
on the family's expected land price inflation. Thus, if the model family expects higher inflation, the
distortion will be much larger.
Under (A.2), the family is assumed to expect that inheritance and capital gains taxes do not change
in real terms for the next fifty years. Although actually there are a lot of changes as demonstrated in
Appendix A, the change is rather ad hoc and sporadic. It is difficult for the family to predict the change
in the tax system. Thus, we make this simple expectational assumption.
In addition to expectational assumptions (A. 1) and (A.2), we ignore property taxes since their effective
rate is very low, between 0.1% and 0.3% depending on a particular year (Iwata et al., 1993). We
also assume that the family earns an average non-capital-gains non-agricultural income of the Tokyo
9metropolitan area.12 Then, we can calculate the expected present value of the Sell-Portfolio W1 and
that of the No-sell Portfolio W2.
Let us now calculate the tax shelter value of the land. We consider how much of the extra price Q
should be added to the market price P to convince the model family to sell the marginal land in the
current period. In other words, we examine the extra price needed to make the Sell Portfolio equivalent
to the No-sell Portfolio. As W1 is the expected present value of the No-sell Portfolio in the current period
and W2 is that of the Sell Portfolio, W1 —W2is the difference of the expected present value between
not selling and selling the marginal land in the current period. The extra revenue 100Q (recall that the
marginal land is lOOm2)issubject to the capital gains tax in the current period and the inheritance tax
in 25 and 50 years from now. Note that under the assumption (A. 1), the present value of the land in
the future is the same as its current value. Then, the family is willing to sell the marginal land only if
W2 + (1 —t)(1 —T25) (1—r50)(100Q) ￿ Wi,
where t is the marginal rate of the capital gains tax in the current period, and r25(r50)is the marginal
rate of the inheritance tax in 25 (50) years from now.
The minimum of such Q is the tax shelter value of the marginal land. Thus, the Tax Shelter Value
TSV of land per square meter is
TB — W1—W2 23 V]
(1—t)(1—r25)(l—Tm)100
The tax shelter value TSV may be positive or negative depending on the sign of W1 —W2.It may
be negative if the "dis-service" of land or tax penalty on land in capital gains taxation outweighs the
"service" of land as a tax shelter in inheritance taxation. If there is no distortion in taxation, we have
TSV =0.
In the empirical analysis later in this section, we will use the tax shelter value calculated from W1
and W2 as an explanatory variable of the regression explaining the current price P. In order to avoid
the simultaneity problem in estimation, we construct W1 and 1472 bused on the model family's expected
current price P' based on the previous-period price such that Pj' =P_i(l+ r)(seeAssumption (A.l)
above), not on the current price P,. This procedure is justified as the first approximation since the result
'2Tlns average income figure is found in the "Receipts and Disbursements of All Workers Households" section of: Statistics
Bureau of Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on Household (Kakei-Ghosa Nenpo).
10is almost the same as in cases where we use the actual current price in the calculation. In the actual
calculation, Pt is the land price in Tokyo and risthe real interest rate. 13
2.2.3 Tax Shelter Value for Farm Family TSVF
Let us first consider the tax shelter value of the land for the model farm family TSVF. We assume
that the model family owns 5, 00Dm2 of farmland, which can be converted to residential land with a
negligible cost. We consider 500Dm2 since it is approximately the median farmland holding in the
Tokyo metropolitan area.14 We are concerned with the change in TSV5 of the typical farm family over
the period of our study. Thus, we calculate TSVF each year for a model family just after the succession
to the previous generation.
Table 2 reports the tax shelter value for farmers as the percentage of the market price between 1958
and 1997. Its movement is astonishing: it started from a negative value of- 7.07% and peaked at 338.33%
in 1991. Even in 1997, the tax shelter value is 128.18% of the market price.
Before 1969, the tax shelter value of the land for the model farm family was negative, implying that
the family had an incentive to sell its marginal land immediately, even if the buyer's offer price was
lower than the market price. In this period, farmland was valued as residential land in calculating the
inheritance tax base, and thus the model farm family had to pay a heavy inheritance tax on its farmland.
The family had to finance the inheritance tax by selling its farmland, but then it had to pay a heavy
capital gains tax due to very progressive taxation on capital gains in this period. Moreover, since the
tax schedule was fixed in nominal terms and the expected land price inflation was high, the more the
model family waited to sell the marginal land, the heavier its tax burden was. Under the tax system of
this period, it happened to be better for the model farm family to sell the marginal land immediately, to
decrease land holding and thus to reduce the inheritance tax on land.
In 1969, the progressive taxation on capital gains was replaced by a flat-rate taxation, which consid-
erably reduced the capital-gains tax burden of the model farm family. This reflects an increase in the
'3The interest rate is tire 3-period Moving Average of average contracted loan rate of all banks (Bank of Japan, Economic
Statistics Annual (Keizai toukei Nenpo)). As to the land price we use tbe average land price in Tokyo. Since the average
land price itself is not available, we compote it by dividing the total valoe of the land in Tokyo by its total area. Here
tire total land valoe is the total value of land and forests of Tokyo owned by private sector (Econmonnc Planning Agency.
Kokumnin Keizai Keisan Nenpo (Annual Report of the National Accounts)), arid the total area is that of the Urbanization
Pronmotion Area (Ministry of Construction, Toshi-keikaku Nenpo (Annual Report on Urban Planning)). These data are
available only fronm 1069 to 1993. We extrapolate tIns average land price backward to 1958 by using tire change in tIne land
price index pnbhsbed by tire Japan Real Estate Research Innstitote, and forward to 1997 by osinig tire change iii tire average
Koji Clnika price iii Tokyo (Land Agency, Chika Koji).
14Accordimng to the Metropolitan Covernnnnnennt of Tokyo, agricultanal land holding between 2,000 arid 10,000 square meters
is 61.0% of tire total in the Ward area of Tokyo. Tire Tokyo Metropolitan Covernmnnent, Tokyo no Tochi (Land of Tokyo),
1998, p. 198.
11tax shelter value, from negative before 1969 to 12-18% of the market value between 1969 and 1974.
In 1974, a special provision for metropolitan farmers was introduced, in which metropolitan farmland
was assessed by the present value of agricultural returns on the land, although the farmland was valued
substantially higher in the market place as residential land. This implied that the model farm family
no longer paid the inheritance tax on its farmland, which made farmland as an ideal tax shelter for
metropolitan farmers. This provision had an immediate and dramatic impact on the tax shelter value:
it jumped from 12.9% in 1974 to 112.97% of the market value in 1975.
Since farmers can save on inheritance taxes by holding their assets in the form of farmland, a higher
land price makes the farmland more attractive as a tax shelter for farmers. The tax shelter value for
farmers steadily increased after 1975 and reached its peak in 1991 as high as 338.33%. This implies that,
in 1991, the model farm family was willing to sell the marginal land only if the buyer's offer price was
almost four and a half times as high as the market price.
The tax shelter value started to decrease in 1992 reflecting a sharp decrease of land prices in the 1990s.
However, the tax reform of 1993 temporarily halted this decline. The 1993 change allowed exemption of
the inheritance tax payment from capital gains if the heirs sold the land in order to pay the inheritance
tax. This change increased the tax shelter value to 257.1% in 1993, because the change exempted the
model farm family from paying the capital gains tax on land sold to pay the inheritance tax.
One anecdote illustrates the tremendous effect of the distortion in human terms. In 1997, the former
student of one of the authors, a graduate of the University of Tokyo and a career-track employee of one
of the top insurance companies in Japan, quitted his job to become a farmer and the successor of his
father. This means that the tax saving due to his decision to succeed his farmer father far exceeded his
lifelong income as an employee of the well-paid insurance company.
It should be noted here that the tax shelter value differs among farmers, depending on their particular
conditions. In particular, it depends on the size of the initial landholdings: the larger the holdings are,
the higher the tax shelter value becomes.Moreover, urgency to sell, or in other words demand for
liquidity, differs considerably among farmers.15 However, the change in the tax system alters the tax
shelter value for various farmers in the same way. Therefore, the model farm family's tax shelter value
can be used as a representative one.
'5A sudden, unexpected death of the head of a farmer family often means that the family must finance the inheritance
tax by selling a part of its land ininiediately, even though the price is not favorable. Tins finance motive is often singled
out to be the most important in indocing a farmer family to sell its land.
122.2.4 Tax Shelter Value for Non-Farm Family TSVvF
Next, consider a non-farm family having 1, 000m2 of residential land. Here we take 1000m2 since it is
a typical large-scale residential land holding. According to the Metropolitan Government of Tokyo, the
share of residential land holding between 500 and 2,000 square meters occupies 20.2% of total residential
land in the Ward area of Tokyo (The Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Tokyo no Tochi [Land in TokyoJ,
1998, p. 184). Table 2 shows the tax shelter value TSVNF for the non-farm family. Although we have the
non-negligible effect of distortionary inheritance and capital gains taxation on residential landholdings,
the magnitude of the effect is rather small compared with the effect on farmland holdings. There has
been a sizable deviation from zero, and the tax shelter value reached the peak of 35.16% of the market
price in 1993. Thus, we can conclude that the distortionary taxation has some effect on non-farm families
but the effect is far outweighed by the effect on farm families.
2.3 Testing the Augmented Present Value Model
As is well-known, the simple present value (PV) model (2.1) fails to explain the short-run behavior of
Japanese land prices. The model is based on the assumption that the land market is efficient, which
is generally rejected in empirical studies on the Japanese land market. For example, Nakagami (1995)
examines excess returns on residential land using the panel data in forty six Japanese prefectures and
rejects the efficiency. Thus, the issue is not whether the simple PV model explains the Japanese land
price behavior perfectly, but to what extent the augmented PV model (2.2) described in the previous
section has an explanatory power.
For residential land, we investigate the augmented PV model such that
P2 =a0+ b1 [FV]2 + b2 [TS VF]2 + b3 [TSVNF]2 + U2, (2.4)
where P2 is the residential land price, [FV]2 is the "fundamental value" of residential land in period t
such that
[FV]2 =t1€, (2.5)
and [TB Vp]2 and [TSVNP]2 represent the tax shelter value for farmers and non-farmers in period t,
respectively. The inclusion of the tax shelter value for farmers reflects the fact that farmland is one of
the most important sources of residential land.
In the case of commercial land, however, it is rather unusual that farmland is directly converted to
commercial land. Thus an appropriate specification of the augmented PV model for the commercial land
13is
P' =a'0+ b'1 [FV'], + b'3 [TSVNF] + i4, (2.6)
where Pt is the commercial land price, and [FV'] is the fundamental value of commercial land defined
accordingly. We scrutinize the augmented PV model from both long-run and short-run perspectives.
In order to investigate the augmented PV models (2.4) and (2.6) directly, we must have the data of
land prices and land rents. However, land rent data have not been readily available, and this difficulty
has plagued previous attempts to assess the PV model in the Japanese land market. One contribution of
this paper is to estimate land rent using various data sources. The method is explained in Appendix B.
Other variables in (2.4) and (2.6) are constructed in the following way. The nominal interest rate i is the
average contracted loan rate of all banks'6. The expected rate of inflationis the three-period moving
average of past inflation rates. The expected price P+, is the forecast based on the AR(3) model of the
land price. The tax shelter values TSVF and TSVNF are the ones calculated in the previous section.
All variables are semi-annual.'7 The sample period is 1958-1997 for residential land and 1963-1997 for
commercial land reflecting data availability.
2.3.1Long-runLand Price Behavior
Let us first examine the order of integration of the key variables in the augmented PV model (2.2).
Table 3 reports the result. In the entire sample period (1958-1997 for residential land and 1963-1997 for
commercial land) ,bothof the commercial and residential land prices are integrated to order two, i.e.,
1(2). The fundamental value and the tax shelter value for farmers are also 1(2), while the tax shelter
value for non-farmers is 1(1). Thus, the fundamental value and the tax shelter value for farmers are
strong candidates to explain land price behavior.
As is pointed out by Ito and Iwaisako (1996), the level of land price is sensitive to changes in the
interest rate as well as the expected growth rate of the land rent, so that it is often argtied that these
two variables may explain the turbulent land price behavior. To investigate this issue, we examined the
order of integration of the real interest rate, and the three-period moving average of rent growth rates
as a stand in for the expected rent growth, for both commercial land and residential land (though not
shown here). All of them were found to be 1(1) in 1958-1997. Although the sample size is small (less
than 100), this result suggests the real interest rate and the expected rent growth (1(1)-variables) are not
'6TIjs is takeii from Kcizai Tovkci Ncnpo [Economic Statistics Annual] (Baiik of Japan, various issues).
'7Tlie tax shelter values are available only annually. We intrapolate semi-annual series from them.
14likely to explain the rampant fluctuations in land prices adequately (1(2)-variables).
Table 3 also shows the variables' order of integration in the subsample period before the outbreak of
the so-called "bubble economy" around 1935. The land prices and the fundamental values are 1(1) for
1958-1935 for residential land and for 1963-1985 for commercial land. Similarly, the tax shelter values
for farmers and for non-farmers are 1(1) for 1958-1985. The difference between this subsample and the
entire sample periods exemplifies extraordinary land price movement after 1985.
Let us now investigate cointegration relationship among the key variables in the Augmented PV
model. We then examine the explanatory power of the PV model and the effect of distortionary taxation
on land prices from the following viewpoints:
(a) In the augmented PV model, b in (2.4) and b in (2.6) must be unity. Otherwise, the
no-arbitrage condition does not hold. Thus, in order to examine the validity of the PV model,
we test whether bi and 62 deviate significantly from unity.
(b) If distortionary taxation on land has significant impacts on land price behavior, 62 and
b in the case of residential land and b in the case of commercial land must be statistically
significant and substantially large.
The equations (2.4) and (2.6) are estimated for the entire sample period and the pre- "bubble economy"
period,18 by the instrumental variables method using the lagged values of regressors in the past two
periods with A(1) error terms. The estimation results are shown in Table 4.
In the case of residential land price, the coiategration relationship expressed in the augmented PV
model cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level in both 1958-1997 and 1958-1985. In 1958-
1997, the coefficient on the fundamental value FV is 0.763 which is significantly lower than unity. The
P value of F statistics reveals that the hypothesis bi =1is rejected at the 5 percent significance level.
The tax shelter value for farmers TSVF has the coefficient of 0.081 while that for non-farmers has 0.486.
Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, the PV model is rejected in
the entire sample, while the effect of distortionary taxation, especially the tax shelter value of farmers
has a significant effect on the behavior of residential land price.
The result of the pre- "bubble economy" period of 1958-1985, however, shows a somewhat different
picture. The coefficient of the fundamental value FV is close to unity, though the hypothesis b =1
'5Althuugh the 'Lix Shelter Value fur iiuu farmers TSVNF is 1(1) while uther variables lu (2.4) and (2.6) are 1(2), we
include TSVNF in the estimatiun taking accuunt uf the fact that the sample periud is rather sliurt and that the puwer uf
Augmented Dicky-Faller (ADF) test in Table 3 is nut su strung fur small samples.
15is rejected at the 5 percent significance level. Neither of the tax shelter value for farmers nor that for
non-farmers have significant coefficients.
This implies that actual land price behavior was close to the one that the simple PV model predicted
before 1985 concerning residential land. However, the PV model clearly failed to hold if land price
behavior after 1985 was taken into consideration, even if we augmented the PV model with the tax
shelter values. The result also shows a large impact of the tax shelter values for both farmers and
non-farmers on residential land price.
In Figure 3, we show the percentage of the actual residential price that is explained by the tax shelter
values in the estimated equation for 1958-1997. The tax shelter values for farmers and non-farmers
increased the residential land price since 1974, and about 15% of the residential land price svas attributed
to the tax shelter values in 1985. It then soared to about 35% in 1991 and 1993, and remained above
20% as of 1996. These results show that the residential land price is substantially affected by distortions
in the tax system.
In the case of commercial land price, the cointegration relationship of the augmented PV model is
rejected at the 5 percent significance level in both, the entire sample period (1963-1997) and the pre-
"bubble economy" period (1963-1985), although the coefficient of the fundamental value FV is close to
unity and the hypothesis of b'1 being unity cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level. This
result suggests that the augmented PV model does not hold as a long-run relation concerning commercial
land even before 1985.
However, the tax shelter value for non-farmers does not fare well, either. Although it has a signif-
icantly positive coefficient in the entire sample period, it has a significantly ne9ative coefficient in the
pre- "bubble economy" period, which contradicts the theory of tax shelter values. Thisresult questions
the model specification (2.6), suggesting the possibility of a missing variable: the "collateral-service"
value discussed in Section 2.1. The estimation and incorporation of its effect on commercial land prices
is an important and pressing research agenda.
2.3.2 Short-Run Land Price Behavior
We next examine the short-run price behavior of prices and the effect of the fundamental value and tax
shelter values. In Table 4, the change in land prices is regressed on the change in the fundamental value
and that in the tax shelter values:
16AP =ao+ b1zX [FV] + b2A [TSVF] + b3 [TSVNF]t + Wt,
for residential land prices. A similar equation is estimated for commercial land prices.
Both in 1963-1997 and 1963-1985 the coefficient on the fundamental value is significantly below unity,
around 0.5, for the residential land price. The effect of the tax shelter value for farmers is still significant
in the entire sample, but it becomes insignificant before the "bubble economy". Moreover, the adjusted
fl2islow both in the entire sample and the pre- "bubble economy" sample. Thus, the augmented PV
model fails to explain short-run land price behavior. The tax shelter values have little effect on short-run
land price behavior before 1985, although the tax shelter value for farmers seems to have a substantial
impact on short-run land price behavior after 1985.
The fundamental value in the case of commercial land price has the coefficient of 0.587 before 1985,
which rises to 0.949 when we include the data during and after the bubble economy. However, the
adjusted B2 is low, implying that the augmented PV model does not adequately explain the short-run
commercial land price behavior. As is similar to the findings of land price levels, the tax shelter value
for non-farmers affects commercial land price insignificantly before 1985, though it has a significantly
positive coefficient in the entire sample.
The foregoing results can be summarized in the following way. The residential land price can be
explained relatively well in the PV framework until 1985, the starting point of the "bubble economy."
However, the PV model fails to explain price behavior of the entire sample period, whose time-series
property is heavily influenced by the turbulent price behavior after 1985. This turbulent behavior is
partly explained by the effect of distortionary inheritance and capital gains tax systems. They raised
the land price by more than 20 percent since 1987. The price of commercial land, however, cannot be
explained even by the augmented PV model incorporating the effect of tax distortions.
The findings obtained in this section for the long- and short-run behavior of residential land price are
in line with the results seen in previous researches. Many empirical researches, using data between 1960
and 1985 (such as those in the various issues of the White Paper of the Economic Planning Agency in
the late 1980s), obtained relatively good results in the simple PV framework. Boone and Sachs (1989)
analyzed the long-run level of land price from the macroeconomic point of view, and showed that the
land price in Japan was not extraordinary high around 1985. However, such attempts broke down as
the price movement of the late 1980s was included in the data set.
17An empirical study by Hutchison (1994) decomposed the variance of the land price change during
the 1955-93 period into the variances of the real CDP change disturbance, the CDP deflator change
disturbance, and the land price change disturbance by a structural VAR model. He found that only a
small part of the land price variance could be attributed to these aggregate demand and supply factors,
while a large part would be attributed to non-macroeconomic factors specific to the land market. Stone
and Siemba (1993) also examined the explanatory power of the PV model. Their conclusion, however,
was not clear-cut, exemplifying fundamental difficulties in using the entire sample period encompassing
the 1960s and the 1980s as a whole to assess the PV model.
Similar results are obtained in variants of the PV model. For example, Sato (1995) examined whether
the land price change (or more precisely, the change in a proxy of the price-to-rent ratio) could be
explained well by the movement of the mortgage rate, the Marshall's k and the average value product of
urban land. The pattern of residuals suggested that the model had difficulty in explaining the movement
in 1985-88. In another attempt, using an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function, 1dm (1997)
showed that in 1980-1982 the actual value of land was almost the same as the theoretical value. The
actual value then increased sharply in the late 1980s to become 6.4 times higher than the theoretical value
in the three main urban areas, Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, and 2.3 times higher in non-urban areas in
1992. Fujita and Kashiwadani (1989) paid attention to the differences in the land prices of farming and
residential lots in the middle suburbs of Tokyo, and their simulation results showed that the actual land
prices in 1980 and 1984 were considerably higher than those associated with the efficient urbanization
process.
3 Excessive Price Sensitivity and Short-Run Land Price Behav-
ior
3.1 Land Market as a Non-Wairasian Asset Market
In the previous section, we have shown that the short-run behavior of land prices is hard to explain in
the framework of the simple as well as augmented PV models. In this section, we will develop a model
of short-run price behavior based on the structure of land markets, and test its validity using residential
and commercial property data.
We start from the fact that the land market is a far cry from the frictionless Walrasian asset market
that the PV model presupposes. The land market is not centrally organized nor has market makers to
18mimic to a certain extent a Wairasian auctioneer. Transaction costs are high. Land is heterogeneous, and
information and thus expectations are imperfect and heterogeneous among sellers and buyers. In many
cases sellers post their asking prices in newspapers and trade networks, and buyers search for the best
buy. If the seller and the buyer meet, sometimes intensive negotiation follows on exact terms of trade. In
such a market, we argue that the price might be excessively sensitive to an unexpected change in factors
affecting the intrinsic value of land.
Let us consider price determination in such a market. In the following we will explain a simple
version of the model proposed in Nishimura (1999).19Consideran encounter of a seller and a buyer. To
make the analysis simple, let us consider a situation where no negotiation is involved and assume that
the seller offers the price, and the buyer determines whether to accept it or not. Both the buyer and the
seller are assumed to be risk neutral. Finally, we assume that if the trade between them fails then there
is no further trade on this land.
Let us consider the seller's pricing problem. Let x2 be the unexpected change in the intrinsic value of
this land i, that is, the value of holding this land. We assume that only the seller knows x1.
The buyer jhashis own subjective expectations about x, denoted by Ei(x). The seller does not
know the expectations E3 (x2) of the particular buyer he encounters, but he is assumed to know the
distribution of the expectations among buyers:
Pr (E(x) <y)=F(y) (3.1)
(For example, an investor survey may be conducted and the result may be made public). The seller
determines his price change p corresponding to x based on this information.
Since the buyer jisrisk neutral, he buys the land if the price change p is no more than his expected
intrinsic-value change x, or equivalently, p <E(xi). Thus, the probability of successful sale, (p) is a
function of p such that
q(pj)=1—F(p). (32)
Taking this iii mind, the risk neutral seller determines p to maximize his expected profit:
'9Nishurnura (1999) specifies the structure of the non-Walrasian asset market and distribution of investors' expectations
in detail, and derives rational expectations (Bayesian Nash)equilibrium.Since it is rather complicated, we adopt a simpler
approach here.
19Max ExpectedProfit1 =qS(p)(p) + (1— (3.3)






is the price elasticity of the sale probability. If the trade is completed, jwillbe the market price change
of the land.
Equation (3.4) shows that the price change p is a mark-up of the unexpected intrinsic-value change
x1. Moreover, the mark-up rate depends on the inverse of the price elasticity 77ofthe sale probability
5(p). The smaller is the elasticity, the more sensitive is the price. Moreover, so long as ?7 is positive
and greater than unity, the coefficient of x in (3.4) is always greater than unity. Thus in this case, we
have excess price sensitivity.
Equation (3.2) implies that the sale probability depends on F, the distribution of buyers' expectations.
Thus, (3.4) shows that the price effect of the unexpected change in the intrinsic value crucially depends
on the shape of the distribution of buyers' expectations.
To illustrate this point, let us note that the price elasticity of 1—F(p1)is small if the absolute
value of 4&'(pj) is small ,forgiven p [> 0] andSince —ç5'(p) =F'(p1)=f(p), where f is the density
function, this means that a smaller value of f (p), or in other words, the more dispersed expectations
around the optimal price, implies a higher price sensitivity. Thus, the foregoing analysis suggests that in
some cases an increase in the variance of expectations' distribution may induce excessive price response
to unexpected change in the intrinsic value of land.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
The non-Walrasian asset model developed in the previous section predicts that the sensitivity of land
prices to unexpected changes in their fundamental value depends on the heterogeneity of investors' ex-
pectations. Specifically, the more dispersed investors' expectations are, the more sensitive land prices
are. In what follows, we examine whether it is true using the Japanese land market data.
20Our analysis is based on the single factor model, in which the asset return R is determined by one
factor F,i.e.
Rte=ct+fitFt+ut, (3.5)
where fit is the factor loading which measures the sensitivity of the asset return to the factor. In the
conventional factor model, fit is assumed to be constant. However, our model (3.4) suggests that it varies
over time depending on the heterogeneity of expectations among investors.
In what follows, we will work with the innovations (i.e. the unexpected parts) of the land return and
of the factor. Assuming that a is constant over time20 and that fit is known in period t —1,we may
rewrite equation (3.5) as:
rt=fitft+ut, (3.6)
where rt is the innovation in the land return and ft is the innovation of the factor, i.e. rt =Rt—E(RtlIt_i)
and ft =F—E(FtlIt_i)where is the information set available up to time t —1.
By definition, we have E(ft lit_i)= 0and E(utlit_i) =0.For identification, we assume that
E(f?jIt_i) =1.We further assume that the t is homoskedastic, i.e. a E(uflit_i) does not depend
on time t.21
We denote the heterogeneity of investors' expectations by at in what follows. The data used for at will
be discussed in the next section. To examine whether fit depends on at, we must specify the functional
form to represent the relation between fit and at. Assuming a Normal distribution of expectations among
investors, Nishimura (1999) shows us that the sensitivity may be asymmetric: the price (and thus the
return) is very sensitive to the factor innovation when investors are on the average optimistic, while it is
not when investors are pessimistic. To incorporate this possibility, we consider the following specification.
fit =go+ (91 + g2Dt1)at, (3.7)
where D_1 is a dummy variable that takes one if rt_i > 0 and zero otherwise. go, g, and 92 are
parameters to be estimated. Here we simply assume that investors are on the average optimisticwhen
the previous period's return innovation is positive, while they become pessimistic when the previous
20The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) predicts that a is a linear function of Pt.Hence,if Pt varies over time depending
on the heterogeneity of expectations among investors, so does a. However, taking it into account will increase the number
of parameters we must estimate. Since the number of observations we can use is limited, we neglect tIre dependence of a
on Pt.
2tSume of the recent empirical studies that apply factor analysis to asset pricing explicitly take into account the bet-
eroskedssticity in both of the asset returns and factors. (See Engle, Ng, arid Rothchild (1990), Ng, Engle, arid Ruthchild
(1992), King, Sentana, and Wadwlrarri (1994), Aguliar and West (1998), and Shephard arid Pitt (1998).) The methods
employed in such studies are, however, computationally expensive. Here, we take a simplified approach.
21period's return innovation is negative. If the null hypothesis of g == 0is rejected, it provides
evidence that fit depends on at. If g is statistically significant, it provides evidence that the effect of at
on fitdiffersdepending on the sign of the innovation in the previous period's return.
One simple method to estimate these parameters is to select a variable that can be considered as a
proxy for the underlying factor. If we can use the innovation in such avariable as ft, the parameters
in the model that consists of equations (3.6) and (3.7) can be estimated by using ordinary least squares
(OLS). However, if the selected variable and the land return are jointly determined, the obtained result
will suffer from the simultaneity bias. To avoid such a problem, we take a different approach, in which
ft is treated as an unobservable factor.
We first select variables that are highly correlated with the land return and hence can be expected to
be determined by the same factor innovation ft. Specifically, we choose two variables. Let us denote the
innovations of the selected two variables by Pit and Y2t We assume that the sensitivities of Pit and Y2t
with respect to ft are constant over time. Under this assumption, rt, Pit and ?12t may be represented by
fit Pit =c1ft+wt,fit—go+(gi+P2-t_i)(7t, (3.8)
112t
where c1 and c2 are the sensitivities of Pit and Y2t with respect to ft. Wt is a (3 x 1) vector of idiosyncratic
error terms, whose first element is itt in equation (3.6). ft and iv are assumed to be distributed asfollows.
/0 cr200\
ft'NID(0,1),wt-..NID1 0,0a 0 . (3.9)
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Weestimate the parameters in this model in the following way. We first extract the innovations
in the selected economic variables and land return using the vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The
VAR model is estimated by using OLS. Given the OLS estimates, we take the residual as innovations
in economic variables and land return. Given the residuals obtained from the VAR, we estimate the
parameters in the system that consists of equations (3.8) and (3.9) by the maximum likelihoodmethod.
Let us define
cr200
Ct[pt,pit,p2t]', E =BB+ 0 a? 0. (3.10) 0 0 a
Then, the log-likelihood may be written as
lnL =-3Tln(2)/2—(l/2)E1nIEI —(1/2)ClEJ'(t. (3.11)
We estimate all parameters in the model that consists of equations (3.8) and (3.9) by maximizing log-
likelihood (3.11).
223.3 Data
3.3.1Property Prices and Property Rents
Let us consider the return on "typical" commercial and residential properties in the metropolitan area
(see Appendix B). The return is calculated from the price and rent data by using the procedure adopted
in Nishimura and Sasaki (1995). The typical commercial property here is an eleven-story building located
in a Ward of Tokyo that was the average of commercial office buildings owned by four major real estate
companies (Mitsui, Mitshubishi, Tokyo Tatemono, and Tokyu) in 1975. The typical residential property
is the average of two-story houses located in the six largest cities.
3.3.2 Economic Variables
We collected semi-annual data on several economic variables that may be expected to affect property
returns in Japan. All of the collected variables are listed in Table 5, and source of these variables are
found in Appendix B. All of these variables and the property returns are measured in real values,22 and
the sample period for these data is from 1970:1 to 1996:1. In the following analyses, we take a logarithm of
all variables. The Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests do not reject the null hypothesis of the presence
of unit root in all variables except money supply, so that we take the first-order differences in all variables
except money supply. As for money supply, we remove the time trend by regressing the log of money
supply on a constant and on time t =1,2,..., T.
Table 5 shows the correlation coefficients between the property return and each of these variables. We
select two variables which are highly correlated with the property return. For the residential property, we
select money supply and total bill-clearing volume and construct a VAR model of these variables together
with the residential property return. For the commercial property, we select total bill-clearing volume
and commercial office vacancy rates and construct again a VAR model of these variables together with
the commercial property return. Both of the Akaike (1973) Information Criterion (AIC) and the Shwarz
(1978) Information Criterion (SIC) suggest the lag length of two. We therefore set the lag length in the
VAR models equal to two.
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the VAR models. LB(12) in the table represents the Ljung-
Box (1978) statistic for up to twelfth order autocorrelation in the residuals. The asymptotic distribution
of this statistic is x2withsix degrees of freedom. Ljung-Box test does not strongly reject the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals of all variables. The null in the residuals of all variables
22T1ie consumer price index in Japan wasusedas deflator.
23except money supply is not rejected at 10% level,while the null in the residuals of money supply is not
rejected at 1% level. fl2inthe table denotes the coefficient of determination. It is worth notingthat
the coefficients of determination for the property returns are large. They are0.799 for the returns on the
residential land and 0.463 for the returns on the commercial land, respectively.It means that 80% of the
variation in the residential property return and 46% of the variation inthe commercial property return
can be expected, providing further evidence for the inefficiencyof the land market in Japan.
3.3.3 The Heterogeneity of Investors' Expectations
To measure the heterogeneity of investors' expectations, we use the surveydata collected by the Bank of
Japan (BOJ). In March, June, September, and December,the BOJ has conducted a survey on whether
the interest rate is expected to fall or rise. We apply the Carlson-Parkin (1975)method to this data to
calculate the standard deviation of the forecasts of interest rate, whichis used as at (See Appendix C
for the detail of our procedure). Similar survey data on the property price,if existed, would be more
desirable, but unfortunately we do not have such data.
The BOJ's survey data is available in March, June, September, and December,and the data on the
economic variables are semi-annual. Hence, our estimation is based on twodifferent at. One is at calcu-
lated using the survey data in March and September, which we callthe March/September case, and the
other is at calculated using the survey data in June and December, which wecall the June/December case.
Figure 4 plots these two different at. The June/December caseis always larger than the March/September
case, but roughly speaking their movementsresemble each other.
The ADF tests reject the null hypothesis of the presence of unit rootand the deterministic time trend
is not observed in these series. Thus, we use each series as it is for atin equation (3.7).
3.4 Estimation Results
Based on the residuals from the VAR model together with at calculated by applyingthe Carlson-Parkin
(1975) method to the BOJ's survey data on the forecastsof interest rate, we estimate parameters in
the model that consists of equations (3.8) and (3.9). Survey data onthe forecasts of interest rate were
available since 1974:2. The estimation is conducted using the sample periodbetween 1974:2 and 1996:1,
which is called the full sample. As extensively discussed in the previoussections, the Japanese asset
markets experienced a bubble-like behavior and also its crash after 1985. Thus,there is a possibility that
the full sample analysis may be biased by extraordinary behavior ofthis period. Hence, we also estimate
24the model using the sub-period between 1974:2 and 1984:2, which can be considered as the pre-bubble
period.
Let us first summarize the results on the residential land, which is shown in Table 7, Panel A. The
most important are parameters 91andg.Inall cases, a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of
g == 0.This provides evidence that the expectation diversity a significantlyaffects price sensitivity
/3t,whichis consistent with our model of non-Walrasian markets.
The table also presents the maximum value and minimum value for the estimates of /3g.Onepossible
problem is that in the sub-sample, the maximum value is positive while the minimum value is negative.
The sign reversal of /3 is problematic to our model because the model predicts that the sign ofdoes
not depend on aandthe absolute value of /3tisincreasing in at. The sign reversal, however, is not
observed in the full sample, where both of the minimum and maximum values are positive. This result
in conjunction with positive estimates of g and 92indicatesthat a rise in aleadsto an increase in the
absolute value of 8.Inall cases except the March/September case in the sub-sample, 92isstatistically
significant, providing evidence that the effect of a, onis larger when the innovation in the previous
period's return is positive. In the June/December case in the full sample, 9iisnot significant, indicating
that ataffects/3tonlywhen the innovation in the previous period's return is positive.
Next, let us turn to the commercial land. Table 7, Panel B summarizes the estimation results for the
commercial land. In all cases, a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of 9i= 92 = 0.The sign
reversal of /3isnot observed in any cases. Hence, the results on the commercial land strongly support
the non-Wairasian model of asset markets.
In all cases, the estimates of 92arepositive and statistically significant, and hence the effect of at on
is larger when the innovation in the previous period's return is positive. Except for the March/September
case in the full sample, 91isnot significant, indicating that at affects /3 only when the innovation in the
previous period's return is positive.
4 Concluding Remarks
Japan remains exotic to the eye of western observers and her economy seems still mysterious to neo-
classical economists. The behavior of Japanese land prices is placed atop of such mysteries. In this
paper, however, we have shown that it is not a mystery but largely a resultof the market structure and
institutional distortions. The failure to recognize the deviation of the land market from the well-behaved
25Wairasian financial market simply made the Japanese land price behavior hard tounderstand. This
paper has shown the limitation of the PV modelthat assumes a Walrasian asset market, as a long-run
theory of land price. In conjunction with this, we have illustratedthe quantitative importance of dis-
tortionary inheritance and capital-gains taxes in understanding turbulentland price behavior in Japan.
It has also been clarified that short-run price behavior is greatly influenced by thenon-Walrasian struc-
ture of the Japanese land market and that land prices become sensitive tothe heterogeneity of investor
expectations.
Factors examined in this paper, however, do not exhaust the list of probable causesof turbulent land
price behavior in Japan. For example, we were obliged to ignorethe "collateral service" value of land
for corporations since we were unable to get quantitative data about such a service.We also ignored the
expectational "bubble" explanation in this paper, in order to concentrate"real factors" behind the land
price behavior. However, as many economists argue, the bubble explanation mayhave some relevance in
explaining the land price behavior. For example, Nishimura (1995) arguedthat a liberal enforcement of
city planning23 and failure to absorb private returns from publicinvestment fostered unduly optimistic
expectations of land prices, regardless of commercial and residentiallands. This may trigger a substantial
increase in land prices which is not explained by the movement of themarket fundamental, as in the
famous Peso problem in international finance. To assess quantitative importanceof these alternative
explanations is an important agenda for future research.
23SeeThkeuchiet a! (1993) for details.
26Appendix A: Transition of Inheritance and Capital Gains Taxes
in Japan: 1958-1997
This appendix summarizes the relevant information about the transition of inheritance and capital gains
taxes in Japan between 1958 and 1997, in calculating the time series of the tax shelter value of land
reported in Table 3.General discussion is found in Barthold and Ito (1992) for the inheritance tax
system and in Ito (1994) for the capital gains tax.
1. Inheritance Tax. After 1958, the inheritance tax in Japan depends now on (a) the number of
statutory heirs, (b) tax exemption, (c) tax rate schedule, and (d) tax credit. The inheritance tax is
calculated on the basis of the total property bequeathed and the number of statutory heirs (and not
distribution among them or nonstatutory heirs). The spouse and surviving children in our model family
are statutory heirs. Once the total property and the number of statutory shares are determined, the
actual tax is calculated in the following seven steps. Relevant information about tax exemption, rate
schedule and tax credit of each year from 1958 to 1997 is summarized in Table A.l.
Step 1: Calculate the inheritance tax base. The inheritance tax base is the total net value
of inherited assets minus basic exemption (fixed and per-statutory-heir exemptions). As
explained in the text, the land is assessed as 60% of its market value while the financial assets
are assessed at the market value.
Step 2: Divide the tax base to each statutory heir according to statutory shares. The share
is 50% for the spouse and 25% for each of the surviving two children if there is a surviving
spouse. If not, the share is 50% for each of the surviving two children.
Step 3: Apply the tax rate schedule to each heir's share of the tax base to get heir-wise taxes.
Step .4:Sumall heir-wise taxes to get a total inheritance tax.
Step 5: Distribute the total tax to each heir proportional to actual division of inherited assets
among heirs.
Step 6: Calculate tax credits based on actual division of inherited assets among heirs.
Step 7: Deduct tax credits from the distributed tax to get actual heir-wise taxes.
2. Capital Gains Tax. Capital gains tax is levied when property is sold. It is a part of the income
tax system, and its tax base is the capital gains net of any expenses.
27Capital gains tax is far more complicated than the inheritance tax system, with various provisions for
specific individuals and corporations. Especially, there are many special provisions for small land owners
to reduce their capital gains tax. However, since our objective is to calculate the tax shelter value of
land for long-term large-scale land owners, we are concerned with the tax rate and special exemption for
them selling "quality residential land". The transition of the tax rate and the special exemption are
reported in Table A.2.
Appendix B: Rent and Price Data
Property price and rent data of Section 3 and land price and rent data of Section 2 are constructed by
the procedure explained in Nishimura and Sasaki (1995). We briefly explain their procedure in this
appendix. A detailed discussion of the procedure is found in Nishimura and Sasaki (1995), which also
contains information about publicly available land price data in Japan.
We consider the price and rent of "typical" commercial and residential properties in the metropolitan
area. The typical commercial property here is an eleven-story building located in a Ward of Tokyo
that was the average of commercial office buildings owned by four major real estate companies (Mitsui,
Mitshubishi, Tokyo Tatemono, and Tokyu) in 1975. The typical residential property is the average of
two-story houses located in the six largest cities (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Kobe, and Yokohama).
As for the commercial property price and rent, we refine the method of Ueda (1992).First, we
estimate every six months the average rent on the rental properties owned by the four major real estate
companies, from their financial statements. Secondly, we estimate the average value of these rental
properties in 1975, using information contained in Keizoku Chinryo no Jittai Shirabe [Survey on Actual
Rollover Rents] (Tokyo: Nichizei Fudosan Kanteishi Kai, 1976). The same survey contains the break-
down of the overall property value into the building value and the land value. Using this information
we estimate the average value of the buildings including the value of the land at that time. The land
value in the other years is then calculated utilizing the data contained in Shigaichi Kakaku Shisu [Urban
Land Price Indices] (Tokyo: Japan Real Estate Institute, various issues). The building value in the other
years is calculated using information about building costs contained in Kenchiku Tokei Nenpo [Annual
Report on Construction] (Ministry of Construction, various issues).
The residential property price and rent are estimated in an analogous way. First, there are rollover
rent data in major cities in Kouri Bukka Chosa [Survey on Retail Prices] (Tokyo: General Administration
Agency, various issues). We calculate the average rent per square meter in the six largest cities. Secondly,
28using information contained in Keizok'u Chinro no Jittai Shirabe like commercial properties, weestimate
the average value per square meter of the rental residential properties in 1975 and its breakdown into
the building value and the land value. The land value in the other years is then calculated utilizing
the data contained in Shigaichi Kakaku Shisu. The building value in the other years is calculated using
information about building costs contained in Zenkoku Mokuzo Kenchikuhi Sisun National Price Index
for Wooden Buildings] (Tokyo: Japan Real Estate Institute, various issues).
The above procedure generates the data of the property rent, the property price, and the latter's
breakdown into the building price and the land price. Remaining is the land rent which is obtained by
subtracting the user cost of the building from the property rent.
In Section 4, we consider various economic variables that may affect land markets. The variables and
their sources are: (a) commercial building starts (floor space): Monthly Construction Statistics (lvlinistry
of Construction); (b) commercial office rent:, Survey on Actual Rollover Office Rents (Tokyo Building
Association), (c) money supply, total bill-clearing volume, Nikkei average, new loan to real estate industry,
and market value of listed real estate companies in Tokyo Stock Exchange; all are taken from Economic
Statistics Annual (Bank of Japan); (d) GDP and fixed capital formation are taken from Annual Report
of National Accounts (Economic Planning Agency).
Appendix C: Carlson=Parkin (1975) method
Carlson and Parkin (1975) introduce a method of extracting quantitative information about thedistri-
bution of expected inflation among economic agents from a survey of their expected direction of price
change.
Suppose that the proportion of responses in period t is computed for each of three categories:A
for "go up"; B for "go down"; and C for "stay unchanged" (A + B + Ct =1.)Carlson and Parkin
assume that the individual answers as follows: (1) "up" if his or her expected inflation rate mtexceeds
a threshold number 6; (2) "down" if mt is below —6;(3)"no change" if mt lies between —and5t.
Under this assumption, we have
A =Pr(mt￿ 6), (C.1)
B =Pr(mt—t5t), (C.2)
=Pr(—5t<mt <ô) (C.3)
It is convenient to standardize mt by the transformation y =(mt
—E (lrt)) /at, where E(rt)andtit are










Equations (0.6) and (0.7) can be solved for E(irt) and cit to give
E(ir) =—St(at+ bt)/(at —bt), (0.8)
=28t/(at
—bt). (0.9)
Suppose that Yt follows the standard normal distribution. We can then compute at and bt from equations
(C.4) and (0.5) given the A anddata. Suppose further that St is constant over time. Then, the role
of St is simply to scale E(ir) (see equation (0.8)). This scaling can be achieved by making the average
value of E(w) over the sample equal to the actual rate of inflation over the sample period, i.e.
(0.10)
Substituting the obtained S into S in equations (0.8) and (0.9) will yield E(w) and cit.
In this paper, we apply the Oarlson=Parkin method to the interest rate forecasts surveyed by the
Bank of Japan, which are obtained from "Nichigin Tankan". Every three months the Bank of Japan has
asked the selected companies in Japan whether they think loan rates will go up, go down or stay the
same over the next three months. Since we are concerned with the interest rate, we use the bank loan
contract rate in stead of lrt in (0.10).
One problem arises in applying the Carlson=Parkin method to our data. Our data, though it is not
so common, includes periods in which no one answers "go up" i.e., A =0or in which no one answers "go
down" Bt =0.In such periods, at or b2 cannot be obtained (see equations (0.4) and (0.5)). To avoid
this problem, we use the following ad hoc adjustment. If A =0(Bt =0),we set A =1%(Bt =1%)
and decrease C by 1%.
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SectorHousehold Corporate Public Household Corporate Public
1970 -2,119 1,624 495 na na na
1971 -3,347 2,706 641 na na na
1972 -4,642 3,791 851 na na na
1973 -6,388 5,531 856 na na na
1974 -3,394 2,343 1,052 na na na
1975 -2,449 1,296 1,153 na na na
1976 -1,953 749 1,204 na na na
1977 -1,524 27 1,497 na na na
1978 -243 -1,593 1,836 na na na
1979 -2,382 327 2,055 na na na
1980 -3,808 1,242 2,566 na na na
1981 -4,175 1,484 2,691 -497 185 312
1982 -3,560 776 2,784 -618 -80 764
1983 -3,610 874 2,736 -702 625 78
1984 -3,178 465 2,713 -671 541 132
1985 -5,649 2,795 2,853 -1,291 1,180 110
1986 -5,899 2,961 2,938 -1,606 1,387 221
1987 -8,806 5,350 3,456 -1,362 1,309 51
1988-12,489 8,437 4,053 -1,163 937 226
1989-14,484 10,273 4,211 -1,167 885 255
1990-17,710 12,985 4,725 -1,782 1,649 133
1991-10,018 5,012 5,006 -1,411 1,072 338































Source: Annual Report on National Accounts 1998, Economic Planning Agency, Tokyo no
Tochi [Land in Tokyo] 1985-1997 Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
Note: "na' denotes "not available'. The corporate sector includes financial and non-financial
organizations, and the public sector includes nonprofit organizations. Entries at the center of
Tokyo before 1989 are the sum of transactions in selected 4 wards and 4 cities, and the
remainders are in 23 wards.
34Table 2. Tax Shelter Value as Percentage of Market Price
Source: Authors calculation.
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TSVF (Tax Shelter Value for Farmer)















Note: The order of integration is obtained by the augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF)
test where the length of lags is determined by the AIC criteria.







Variable Coefficient 1-stat.DWAdj.R2 Fstat(P) n
Residential






































Notes: (1) DW is the Darbin-Watson statistics. (2) Fstat(P)isthe P value of Fstatisticsfor the constraint that the
coefficient of the FV should be unity. (3) Rho is the lag coefficient of AR( I) errors. (4) Sign **inthe Cointegration column
shows that the cointegration relationship among dependent and independent variables cannot be rejected at 5% significance
level.
37Table 5. Correlation coefficients between return and each variable
variable correlation coefficient
Residential land
1 Money Supply 0.411
2 Total bill-clearing volume 0.401
3 Nikkei average 0.211
4 GDP 0.204
5 Fixed capital formation 0.189
6 New loan to 0.177
real estate industry
7 Residential rent index -0.111
8 Housing starts -0.075
9 Market value of -0.048
listed real estate companies
(Tokyo Stock Exchange)
10 Land transactions 0.006
Commercial land
1 Total bill-clearing volume 0.402
2 Commercial office vacancy rate -0.343
3 New loan to 0.334
real estate industry
4 GDP 0.315
5 Money supply 0.297
6 Fixed capital formation 0.268
7 Commercial building starts 0.164
(floor space)
8 Commercial office rent 0.132
(new contracts)
9 Nikkei average 0.127
10 Market value of 0.090
listed real estate companies
(Tokyo Stock Exchange)
11 Land transactions -0.05 5
38Table 6. OLS Estimation of the VAR model.
Panel A. Residential Land
=returnon the residential land
=detrendedlog money supply
Y2= first-orderdifference in the log of total bill-clearing volume
Dependent variable
Independent variablesP Y1










Y2,_1 0.161' 0.022 0.151
(0.054) (0.025)(0.153)
Y2,_2 0.084 0.032 -0.072
(0.058) (0.026)(0.164)
0.799 0.959 0.186
LB(12) 8.66 13.26** 7.16
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. R2 is the coefficient of determination. LB(12)
is the Ljung=Box statistic fur up to twelfth order autocorrelation in the residuals. The
asymptotic distribution of LR(12) is x2withsix degrees of freedom. x2(6)criticalvalues:
10.64 (10%), 12.59 (5%), 16.81 (1%). ",", and*detlote statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively.
39Panel B. Commercial Land
return on the residential land
Y1 =first-orderdifference in the log of commercial office vacancy rate

















R2 0.463 0.163 0.205
LB(12) 10.29 4.04 10.32
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. R2 is the coefficient of determination. LB(12)
is the Ljung=Box statistic for up to twelfth order autocorrelation in the residuals. The
asymptotic distribution of LR(12) is x2withsix degrees of freedom. x2(6)criticalvalues:
10.64 (10%), 12.59 (5%), 16.81 (1%). ",", anddeiiote statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively.
40Table 7. Maximum likelihood estimation of the model that consists of equations
(3.8) and (3.9)
Panel A. Residential Land
yit =innovationin the log of money supply
















































































Log-likelihood 271.3 269.7 154.7
LR for ho
91 =920 8.12 5.02 10.39" 13.81
Mm 0.014 0.019 -0.017 -0.017
Max 0.069 0.044 0.059 0.029
* Figuresin parentheses arestandard errors. , • *, anddenotestatisticalsignificance at
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. LR is the likelihood ratio statistic to test the null hypothesis of
go =gi=0.The asymptotic distribution of this statistic is x2 with two degrees of freedom.
2(2) critical values: 4.61 (10%), 5.99 (5%), 9.21 (1%). Miii and Max are tile minimum and
maximum values of the estimates of .
41Panel B. Commercial Land
yit= innovationin the log of commercial office vacancy rate















































































Log-likelihood 90.5 90.0 54.1 54.6
LR for ho
91 =92 = 0 10.23* 9.36" 6.60" 7.59"
/3
Mm 0.007 0.029 0.017 0.052
Max 0.117 0.107 0.170 0.164
* Figuresin parentheses are standard errors. "',", and'denote statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. LR is the likelihood ratio statistic to test the null hypothesis of
go =91 = 0.The asymptotic distribution of this statistic is x°withtwo degrees of freedon.
y2(2) critical values: 4.61 (10%), 5.99 (5%), 9.21 (1%). Mm and Max are the minimum and
maximum values of the estimates of .
42Table A.1. Transition of Inheritance Taxation: 1958-1997
Unit =Millionyen
Year 1958-1961 1962-1963 1964-19651966-1970 1971-1972 1973-1974 1975- 1987 1988-1991 1992-19931994-present
Basic_Exemption
Fixed 1.5 2
I 2.5 4 6 20 40 48 50
PerStatutory
Heir



































































Special Exemplion and Tax Credit for Surviving Spouse
Exemption no special provision 2 4 6 no special provision










Mm [X, spouse's actually inherited asset
value]
x =Max[Y million yen, value of spouse's
statutory share]
Y =80 Y =160
Special Exemption for Farmer'sHeirs
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau, An Outline of Japanese Taxes (various issues).
Note: This table shows only thepartof the inheritance tax system whichis relevant to the model family described in the text.
43Table A.2. Transition of Capital Gains Taxation on Long-Term Large-ScaleLand Holding: 1958-1997
Unit =millionyen
Year '-'68
Eligibility of "long- •,,
termholding
over 3 years over 5 years
















40-60 progressive rate(*) 14 20
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::






























Marginal Tax Rate for Farmland in Metropolitan Area (%)
Bracket
20 26 26







-j35.5 No special provision
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau, An Outline ofJapune,ceTaxes (various issues). This table shows oniy a part of the capital gain system whichis
relevant to the model family described in the text.
Notes: (5)1/2of capital gain with an exemption of 0.3 million yen is added to usual income tax base,and is taxed as usual income; () 3/4 of this part is
are added to usual income tax base, and is taxed as usual income. The resulting taxis added to the first 26% tax; (*5*)1/2of this part is added to usual
income tax base, and is taxed as usual income, If capital gain exceeds 80 million yen, 3/4
of that part is added to usual income tax base. The resulting tax
is added to the first 26% tax. (5*5*)Thetax reform of 1993 allowed exemption of the inheritance tax payment from capital gainsif the heirs sell the land







Figure 1 Nominal Residential Land Price, Stock Price and CPI
(1955.3=1)
ropolitan Residential Land Price -0 -- CPI —— Stock
Source: Land Price (Urban Land Price Index, Japan Real Estate Institute), Stock Price (TOPIX, Tokyo Stock
Exchange),
















Figure 2 Rate of Change of Nominal Land Price, Stock Price and CPI
I
•Metropolitan Residential Land Price"0- - CPJ—-—StJ
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